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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the views of Belgian politicians on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), an ambitious project to harmonize corporate taxation in the EU. Applying case study method-
ology, the results show that most politicians were proponents of this new tax system. During the discus-
sions in several political institutions, the politicians referred to the macro-economic impact, the legal 
certainty and their party’s view to found their opinion. Besides several agreements, certain aspects of 
CCCTB like the optionality and the applied tax rate involved clear differences in view between left and 
right-wing politicians, which could hamper a political agreement on CCCTB.
Dit artikel analyseert de visie van Belgische politici m.b.t. de Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base, een ambitieus Europees project om de vennootschapsbelasting te harmoniseren. Gebruikma-
kend van case studie methodologie, toont deze studie aan dat de meerderheid van de Belgische politici 
voorstander is van dit nieuwe belastingsysteem. Tijdens de discussies in talrijke politieke instellingen, 
hanteerden de politici economische, juridische en partijpolitieke argumenten om hun visie te onder-
bouwen. Ondanks de vele overeenkomsten, waren er o.a. duidelijke links-rechts tegenstellingen m.b.t. 
de optionaliteit van CCCTB en het toepasselijk tarief, wat een compromis m.b.t. CCCTB kan bemoeilij-
ken.
Keywords: CCCTB – corporate tax harmonization – European Union – Belgian politicians – 
case study
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1. INTRODUCTION
On 16 March 2011, the European Commis-
sion (EC) launched its proposal for a Council 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base (CCCTB). According to this pro-
posal, the implementation of CCCTB would be 
optional for groups, i.e. they would be able to 
choose between the CCCTB and the existing 
national corporate tax system. In the EU, each 
group company opting for CCCTB would use 
a common set of rules to calculate its individ-
ual taxable profit. These individual tax bases 
would then be summed up to the consolidat-
ed tax base. This consolidation of tax bases 
would result in the elimination of intra-group 
transactions and off-set of losses. Thereafter, 
the consolidated tax base would be allocated 
among the individual companies according 
to their proportions in the group’s total of la-
bour, sales, and tangible assets, i.e. ‘formula 
apportionment’. Finally, as the Commission 
would not have the intention to introduce a 
harmonised corporate tax rate, each member 
state would preserve the right to apply its own 
tax rate to the obtained share of the overall 
tax base. Under CCCTB, groups of companies 
would be able to use a ‘one-stop-shop’ sys-
tem, i.e. they could file a single consolidated 
tax return for all their activities in the EU with 
the principal tax authority (EC, 2011).
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Since the launch of the CCCTB proposal in 2011, further devel-
opments took place at the political level. Within eight weeks 
from the publication of the CCCTB proposal, all national par-
liaments had the right to assess whether the CCCTB propos-
al complied with the general principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality (EU, 2012). About one year later, on 19 April 
2012, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) casted 
their votes on the EC’s proposal for a CCCTB (EP, 2012a). At 
present, the proposal is negotiated in the Council which has 
final decision power on the adoption of a CCCTB (Council of 
the European Union, 2016). Very recently, the Commission re-
launched CCCTB as it believes the tax system needs a stepwise 
approach to reach an agreement (EC, 2016). This relaunch will 
be assessed again by the national parliaments, the European 
Parliament and the Council.
Using documentation and archival records, this paper discuss-
es the views of Belgian politicians on the 2011 CCCTB proposal 
in the Belgian Parliament, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union. In general, this research is use-
ful to gain insight in the political feasibility of the (re-launched) 
CCCTB and its future developments. Elabo-
rating on the development of CCCTB from a 
Belgian point of view, this paper contributes 
to the literature in three more ways. First, al-
though exceptional in the CCCTB literature, 
the case study methodology was chosen for 
this purpose. As CCCTB implies a complex 
political process of negotiations at several levels, the use of 
case study methodology was considered as more opportune 
in terms of gaining insights compared to other methodologies 
(Yin, 2003). Second, to the best of our knowledge, studies ex-
amining the political views on CCCTB in one particular coun-
try are lacking1. In addition, Belgium is a likely candidate for 
the procedure of ‘enhanced cooperation’ where a minimum 
number of nine member states would introduce CCCTB (Bel-
gian Chamber of Representatives, 2011b). So, studying the Bel-
gian point of view is interesting as this view will be relevant in 
further developments of CCCTB. Third, current literature ap-
proaches this new tax system from an economic or legal per-
spective only. This case study attempts to draw a full picture by 
combining literature from the fields of economics, tax law and 
political science.
1 Roggeman, Verleyen, Van Cauwenberge & Coppens (2015) covered for 
28 EU member states the relationship between the voting behaviour 
of members of the European Parliament on CCCTB and the estimated 
economic impact of CCCTB. However, this large-scale study does not 
give insight into the discussions, reasonings and personal beliefs of 
these politicians.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 theoretically de-
scribes which factors could play a role in the politicians’ opin-
ion about CCCTB. Section 3 explains the methodology used in 
this paper. Section 4 discusses the findings and section 5 con-
cludes.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Macro-economic effects
The economic principle of ‘efficiency’ is widely recognized for 
evaluating the desirability of tax systems (Desai & Hines, 2003). 
An efficient tax system implies that taxes should not influence 
the taxpayer’s economic decisions. However, if taxation at the 
micro-level is not efficient, this would also lead to an alloca-
tion which is not Pareto-optimal (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989; 
Schäfer, 2006). In the context of the introduction of a CCCTB, 
only a limited number of macro-economic studies investigated 
if this new corporate tax system would be more efficient or Pa-
reto improving compared to the current twenty-eight national 
corporate tax systems in the EU (e.g. Runkel 
& Schjelderup, 2011). Otherwise said, these 
studies investigated if CCCTB would make 
member states better off without making oth-
er member states worse off. In the literature, 
however, no consensus is reached on how 
such a Pareto improvement should be meas-
ured (Avi-Yonah & Clausing, 2008). Most studies only consid-
ered the corporate tax revenues of member states, while other 
studies also took into account other criteria like welfare, GDP, 
investments and employment.
Table 1 summarizes the results of three empirical studies2 
which appeared after the publication of the CCCTB proposal 
(EC, 2011). At the country level, we only report the results for 
Belgium as this is the focus of our paper.
2 Despite the merits of the empirical studies of Fuest, Hemmelgarn, & 
Ramb (2007) and Devereux & Loretz (2008), we do not consider these 
older studies as they substantially deviate from the proposal.
“CCCTB is one of the 
most ambitious projects 
to harmonize corporate 
taxation in the EU.”
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The findings show that the EU as a whole would mostly lose 
from introducing CCCTB, which suggests that it would be rath-
er unlikely that a move towards CCCTB would be Pareto-im-
proving. All three studies agree that the EU would not be better 
off in terms of employment, GDP and investments. However, 
the studies disagree with respect to the change in corporate 
tax revenues. Looking at the economic impact measures for 
Belgium, significant differences can be observed between the 
three studies, so that it is difficult to draw general conclusions. 
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to explain these 
differences between the three impact studies, they could be 
attributed to divergent databases, different parameters under-
lying the simulations, various approaches to proxy for taxable 
income, deviations in the applied formula apportionment or 
the choice of a static versus a behavioural approach.
2.2. Party ideology
Studies of Bowler & Farrell (1995) and Corbett, Jacobs, & Shak-
leton (2011) have shown that politicians with functions like 
chair, vice-chair, rapporteur, expert or party group coordinator 
play a key role in the opinion formation of legislative proce-
dures. However, these initiators are subject to ‘party discipline’. 
Party discipline implies that party leaders are able to impose 
sanctions on politicians who deviate from the party position. 
Strong party leaders could enforce this discipline by controlling 
the (re)election prospects and future leadership positions of 
politicians (Faas, 2003; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005).
With respect to voting behaviour in the EP, Hix (2002) found 
that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were ex-
posed to national party discipline as well as European party 
discipline. In particular, MEPs had to follow the instructions of 
the principal who controlled their EP election, i.e. the national 
party, and the instructions of the principal who controlled their 
influence in the EP, i.e. the EP party. Long term studies in the 
EP revealed that the extent to which party members vote in the 
same way, i.e. ‘cohesion’, has become stronger over time, both 
at the national and European party level. Further, these studies 
showed that national cohesion was higher for Euro-sceptical 
parties and topics of great national importance (Faas, 2003; Hix 
et al., 2005).
In the literature, two ideological dimensions can be distin-
guished with respect to the position of the party. First, the pro/
anti Europe dimension deals with the party’s attitude towards 
European integration. In particular, this dimension concerns 
the question how fast and far-reaching European integration 
should proceed. Centrist parties like the socialist, liberals and 
conservatives are typically the ardent supporters of integration 
while more left and right oriented parties in Europe are more 
hesitant to give up national autonomy (Aspinwall, 2002; Hix, 
Noury, & Roland, 2007; Hix & Noury, 2009). Second, a tradi-
tional left-right dimension can be distinguished among parties. 
In general, left parties favour more strict government regula-
tion whereas right parties prefer a more liberal ‘laissez faire’ 
economic policy (Aspinwall, 2002; Hix et al., 2007; Hix & Noury, 
2009; Osterloh & Debus, 2012).
Table 1. Summary results of empirical impact studies CCCTB (in %)
  Oestreicher and Koch (2011) EC Bettendorf et al. (2011) E&Y Cline et al. (2011)
  optional compulsory optional compulsory optional compulsory
revenues
BE -10.66 (-) -3.33 (-) n.a. 0.27 (+) -1.10 (-) 2.10 (+)
EU -4.65 (-) -4.56 (-) 0.00 0.06 (+) -0.60 (-) 0.20 (+)
welfare
BE 1.21 (+) 1.11 (+)
EU 0.02 (+) 0.02 (+)
employment
BE -0.16 (-) -0.50 (-) 0.00 (+) 0.10 (+)
EU 0.00 -0.05 (-) -0.10 (-) -0.30 (-)
GDP
BE 2.10 (+) 0.92 (+) -0.10 (-) 0.10 (+)
EU -0.15 (-) -0.25 (-) -0.10 (-) -0.20 (-)
investments
BE -2.89 (-) -4.82 (-) -0.20 (-) 0.50 (+)
EU     -0.74 (-) -1.25 (-) -0.50 (-) -1.10 (-)
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2.3. Legal certainty
Legal certainty is one of the most fundamental legal values 
which also applies to taxation. According to the legal philoso-
pher Fuller (1969), laws should be clear, stable and enforceable 
in order to achieve legal certainty. Clear and transparent rules 
would ensure that laws would have an accurate meaning and 
that they would be unambiguous by those who are subject to 
it. The requirement of stability would imply that laws should 
not be changed too frequently as this would make it hard for 
citizens to behave in accordance with these laws. Finally, the 
enforcement of laws would deal with the use of public agents 
to detect and sanction violators of legal rules and this should 
occur in a cost-effective way (Fuller, 1969; Raitio, 2003).
In the context of the CCCTB proposal, the legal certainty of the 
proposed rules was assessed in several tax law studies. Freed-
man & McDonald (2008) evaluated the preliminary documents 
of CCCTB with respect to the common tax base. They argued 
that CCCTB should explicitly refer to IFRS and combine this 
reference point with an autonomous set of tax principles. The 
study of de La Feria & Dorado (2008) assessed the introduction 
of a thin capitalization rule3 in the context of a CCCTB. Accord-
ing to the authors, the introduction of a specific instead of a 
general anti-abuse rule would increase the legal certainty of 
thin capitalization. In addition, the rule should be compatible 
with EC law and the EC provisions on the fundamental free-
doms like the free movement of capital. The recent studies 
of Lang (2012) and Lang, Pistone, Schuch, Staringer, & Storck 
(2013) evaluated the legal impact of CCCTB in relationship to 
third countries. In particular, the authors discussed the arti-
cles of the proposal with respect to, for example, interest de-
ductibility, transfer of assets, transparent entities, withholding 
taxation, and double taxation conventions. In general4, it was 
concluded that the CCCTB proposal represented an impressive 
legal achievement. However, the legal certainty was problem-
atic in several aspects.
First, difficulties with interpretation appeared as the definition 
of dividends, for example, was not aligned with other interna-
tional tax law. In order to increase clarity, the authors suggest-
ed that CCCTB would follow the wording of provisions of an 
already existing Directive, for example the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive. Second, conflicts existed between the rules of CCCTB 
and Double Tax Conventions (DTCs). For example, a DTC could 
avoid double taxation of dividends by the credit method where-
3 Thin capitalization rules limit a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio to control 
highly leveraged financing structures.
4 A detailed discussion of all considered articles is beyond the scope 
of this paper. For more details we refer to Lang (2012) and Lang et al. 
(2013).
as CCCTB would apply the exemption method5. In this respect, 
Lang et al. (2013) are advocates of a European Union-wide DTC. 
Such an EU DTC would harmonize all existing bilateral tax trea-
ties and would be a promising way to apply CCCTB in a correct 
way. The study of Panayi (2013) stressed that it would be very 
likely that the enforcement of CCCTB would entail high admin-
istrative costs for tax authorities. In particular, tax authorities 
would be faced with two distinct tax systems, namely CCCTB 
and the applicable national corporate tax system. Also, the 
cross-border nature of tax audits and the frequent interactions 
with other tax authorities would result in additional costs.
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
Referring to the findings in the literature (cfr. section 2), we ex-
amine the following research questions:
- To what extent and how did Belgian politicians refer 
to the macro-economic impacts of CCCTB as an argu-
ment to support or refuse CCCTB?
- To what extent and how were Belgian politicians influ-
enced by party ideology?
- To what extent and how did Belgian politicians attach 
importance to legal certainty when expressing their 
views about CCCTB?
As in-depth studies concerning the political view about CCCTB 
are lacking, a case study approach was chosen to produce 
more detailed information on this topic. Moreover, to describe 
the political view in relation to the macro-economic, ideological 
and legal perspectives, the use of a case study would be more 
opportune in terms of gaining insights into this relationship. Or 
as Yin (2003) generally declares: “case studies are the preferred 
strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when 
the investigator has little control over events, and when the fo-
cus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context” (Yin, 2003).
Our Belgian case study employs an embedded design (Eisen-
hardt, 1989) as three levels of analysis are involved in the case. 
In particular, we discuss the Belgian position at the level of the 
politician, the party level and at the country level. However, 
as our research questions are defined at the individual level, 
the politician is considered as our primary unit of analysis (Yin, 
2003). In the context of CCCTB, an embedded design is pre-
ferred above a holistic design as CCCTB implies a complex po-
5 Under the exemption method the country of residence exempts the 
received income of the source country. Under the credit method both 
countries tax the income, but the country of residence grants a credit 
for the tax paid in the source country.
5 Accountancy & Bedrijfskunde, 2019
litical process of negotiations at several levels. For that reason, 
our case study not only focuses on the primary unit of analysis, 
but also considers the larger units of analysis.
In order to enhance the reliability of the findings, multiple 
sources of data6 were obtained and analyzed (Patton, 2002; 
Silverman, 2005). First, documentation – like letters, minutes 
of meetings, written reports, articles – were collected and put 
into a database. Second, archival records were collected and 
these records contained vote outcomes, party 
names, personal names and other personal 
data like gender and age. Further, the theoret-
ical framework was replicated as the Belgian 
politicians’ views were analyzed at three dif-
ferent development stages of CCCTB, namely 
the developments in the Belgian Parliament, 
the European Parliament and the Council. Finally, to enhance 
the validity of our study, a key informant reviewed the accu-
racy of the actual facts presented in the case report. Also, this 
review was useful as new materials and alternative interpreta-
tions of the findings could be added.
4. FINDINGS CASE STUDY
4.1. Belgian Parliament
According to Protocol nr. 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, member states 
have the right to assess whether legislative proposals by the 
European Commission comply with the general principles of 
‘subsidiarity’ and ‘proportionality’. The subsidiarity principle 
means that in areas of shared competence, as is the case with 
CCCTB, the EU can only act insofar the objectives of the pro-
posed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member 
states themselves. Proportionality entails that the least oner-
ous measure should be chosen and that the disadvantages 
may not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (EU, 2012). 
Within eight weeks from the publication of the CCCTB propos-
al, all national parliaments could send their reasoned opinions 
to the Commission. Each unicameral national Parliament dis-
posed of two votes and if a bicameral system applied7, each 
chamber had one vote. If the number of reasoned opinions 
represented at least one-third of the total votes, the so-called 
‘yellow card procedure’ had to be applied. In that case the Com-
mission should re-consider the proposal and decide whether 
to maintain, amend or withdraw it (EU, 2012). However, the 
CCCTB proposal could escape this yellow card procedure. The 
6 The collection of information from multiple sources is called ‘data tri-
angulation’ (Patton, 2002).
7 The Belgian Federal Parliament is a bicameral parliament consisting of 
the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate.
minimum number of yellow cards, notably 18 votes (i.e. one 
third of 54 votes) was not reached. In total, 13 negative votes 
were counted coming from Bulgaria, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ireland, the United Kingdom and 
Sweden (Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 2011a).
The Commission of Finance and Budget of the Belgian Par-
liament (CFB) examined the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principle of the CCCTB proposal on the 11th and 17th of May, 
2011. Each party8 disposed of a fixed number 
of members in the CFB who put forward their 
opinion. Table 2 gives an overview of the argu-
ments used by the members of the CFB. For 
practical reasons, we only mention the names 
of the political parties in the text and no per-
sonal names. The personal names of the CFB 
members are reported in Appendix 1. As the CFB members ex-
amined if CCCTB complied with the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, it could be argued that this opinion would 
not include a comprehensive judgment about CCCTB. Howev-
er, as CCCTB was very broadly discussed the evaluation of this 
new tax system was not limited to these principles.
In general, most members were positive about the CCCTB 
proposal and found that the principles of subsidiarity and pro-
portionality were not violated. However, the members of the 
Walloon liberal (MR) and christian-democratic party (cdH) did 
not agree with this position. According to them, more infor-
mation was needed to take this decision (Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives, 2011a). When analyzing the discussions of the 
members into more detail, we could distinguish five subjects of 
discussion: (i) macro-economic effects, (ii) corporate tax rate, 
(iii) optionality, (iv) characteristics country and (v) other issues 
(Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 2011a).
8 In the federal parliament of Belgium most political families consist of a 
Flemish and Walloon party.
“The Belgian politicians 
referred to macro-economic, 
legal and party related 
arguments to found their 
opinion about CCCTB.”
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A striking finding is that all members referred to the mac-
ro-economic impact of CCCTB (i) to defend their interests. 
Some spoke in general terms, whereas others picked out re-
sults of specific impact studies. For example, a representative 
of the socialist party referred to the E&Y study by Cline, Neubig, 
Philips, Sanger, & Walsh (2011) and informed that under a com-
pulsory CCCTB tax revenues and employment would increase 
for Belgium. A member of the conservative party N-VA men-
tioned the EC study by Bettendorf, van der Horst, de Mooij, De-
vereux, & Loretz (2011) and quoted the impact for Belgium in 
terms of welfare (+1.21%), employment (-0.16%), investments 
(-2.89%) and GDP (+2.10%) (Belgian Chamber of Represent-
atives, 2011a). The literature review under section 2 showed 
that we could not draw general conclusions for Belgium. How-
ever, the members of the CFB did not sketch the full picture 
as they limited themselves to a selection of certain results. In 
some respect, the findings suggest that the CFB members were 
cherry picking to defend their interests.
Further, all members agreed that CCCTB should be mandatory 
as the legal enforcement of an optional system (iii) would imply 
high compliance costs for tax administrations. However, a so-
cialist member would provide for a transition period, whereas a 
liberal member would only impose a mandatory CCCTB for big 
companies. Further, members from centrist parties stressed 
that under an optional system, not only tax administrations but 
also companies, would suffer from high compliance costs. In 
particular, in order to make their choice companies should call 
in professional advice. Further, green and socialist members 
feared that the cooperation between the different tax adminis-
trations (v) would be problematic. However, an efficient collec-
tion and control of the different corporate income taxes would 
be essential to achieve legal certainty. By contrast, a member 
of VB argued that CCCTB would give the opportunity to achieve 
administrative simplification (Belgian Chamber of Representa-
tives, 2011a).
Another discussion dealt with the applied tax rate under 
CCCTB. According to the CCCTB proposal, each member state 
would apply its own national tax rate (ii) to the received part of 
the consolidated tax base (EC, 2011). During the discussions in 
the CFB, a clear difference in view appeared between members 
of the left and right parties. Members of left parties preferred 
to extend European integration by introducing a harmonized 
tax rate, a minimum tax rate or range of tax rates to tackle the 
harmful effects of tax competition. By contrast, members of 
right parties argued that tax rate competition would improve 
the competitiveness of the EU and therefore the determina-
tion of the corporate tax rate should stay under the sovereign-
ty of the individual countries. Further, right oriented members 
regretted the prohibition to apply (v) the notional interest de-
ductions (NID), whereas left oriented members welcomed this 
decision (Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 2011a).
An element which we did not anticipate in the theoretical sec-
tion, is that all members evaluated CCCTB not only in terms 
of efficiency, but also in terms of equity. In an international 
context, equity means that the source country has the right to 
tax the profits which are generated within its jurisdiction (Mus-
grave, 2000). According to the EC, the factors tangible assets, 
labour and sales are the dominant factors in the generation 
of profit and considered as fair factors to include in the appor-
tionment formula (EC, 2011). However, during the discussions 
in the CFB all members agreed that the apportionment formu-
la would not be fair as it would favour old industrial economies 
at the expense of knowledge and service based open econo-
mies (iv). Some politicians proposed to include intangible as-
sets and financial assets in the formula (Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives, 2011a).
Eventually, the CFB reached a consensus on the advice of the 
Belgian Parliament concerning the subsidiarity and propor-
tionality of the CCCTB proposal. The advice of the CFB was 
approved with 12 votes in favour and 4 abstentions9. In the 
text, it was mentioned that the subsidiarity principle was not 
violated as the EU would be more appropriate to achieve the 
objectives of CCCTB compared to Belgium. In particular, when 
applying a CCCTB the EU would be able to abolish fiscal ob-
stacles hampering growth in the internal market and limit the 
negative impacts of tax competition. With respect to the prin-
ciple of proportionality, the CFB did not express its view yet. 
Pending its decision, it asked for a detailed impact study car-
ried out by the Belgian federal government. In particular, the 
study should look to what extent the impact of CCCTB would 
be related to the openness and size of a country as well as the 
size of companies opting for CCCTB. The study should also ex-
amine to what extent the introduction of CCCTB would lead to 
additional costs resulting from the existence of two different 
corporate tax systems and the need to keep separate fiscal ac-
counts. Moreover, the CFB stressed the importance of studying 
the impact of CCCTB on Belgium’s economic growth, employ-
ment and social protection. Also, the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the optionality of CCCTB should be examined in detail, 
as well as the opportunity to harmonize national corporate tax 
rates (Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 2011a).
4.2. European Parliament
Immediately after the announcement of the EC’s proposal for 
a CCCTB in March 2011, the proposal was transferred to the 
9 No individual vote outcomes were made public.
10
What do politicians think of the common consolidated corporate tax base?
European Parliament (EP). At that moment, the EP consisted 
of 754 elected members spread over seven European political 
parties and a group of independents10. According to Article 115 
of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
the consultation procedure applies to decisions concerning di-
rect taxation such as the CCCTB. This ‘special legislative’ proce-
dure describes the EP’s role as a consultative one. So, it could 
be argued that the EP’s opinion about CCCTB is not binding11. 
However, the consultation procedure would also imply that 
the members of the EP were not inhibited to express their real 
opinion.
Each member of the EP (MEP) was invited to introduce amend-
ments to the proposal. In total, 425 amendments were submit-
ted. As Belgium is the focus of this paper, we only mention the 
14 amendments which were submitted by the Belgian member 
Philippe Lamberts. At that time, he was vice-chairman of the 
Greens-European Free Alliance (EP, 2011). In summary, these 
14 amendments dealt with five subjects. First, the Belgian 
member was a proponent to introduce a minimum tax rate 
of 15% in 2013, 20% in 2015 and 25% in 2017. Second, CCCTB 
should be compulsory except for SMEs. Third, CCCTB should 
provide for an additional EU corporate income tax of 5% ap-
plied to big companies as a resource to support poor regions 
within the EU. Fourth, losses incurred before the introduction 
of CCCTB should be disregarded and the carry forward of new 
losses should be limited to five years. Finally, a third country 
would be considered as a tax heaven if its tax rate would be 
below 100% of the average statutory rate in the EU (EP, 2011). 
The demands to introduce a minimum tax rate and mandatory 
CCCTB were also claimed by the representative of the Belgian 
Green party in the CFB (see section 4.1).
10 Parties of the seventh European Parliament: European United 
Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL), the Greens-European Free Alliance 
(Greens/EFA), Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE/ADLE), European 
People’s Party (EPP), European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) and the Non-Inscrits or in-
dependents (NI).
11 Kardasheva (2009) studied consultation procedures in the EP over 
the period 1999-2007. The results showed that the EP would become 
more influential when it gets support from the EC. On 19 April 2012, 
the EC largely agreed with the amended CCCTB proposal of the EP.
Considering all 425 amendments submitted in the EP’s Com-
mittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Belgian rapporteur 
Marianne Thyssen finally adapted the initial EC’s proposal by 
including 38 amendments12. We mention the most striking 
amendments of Thyssen’s text13 (EP, 2012a). First, a mandato-
ry CCCTB was recommended for all companies except SMEs, 
whereas the EC originally proposed an optional system for all 
companies. Another remarkable amendment was the intro-
duction of a more strict general anti-abuse rule. In particular, 
Article 80 of the EC’s proposal was adjusted by formulating 
that “artificial transactions carried out mainly instead of sole-
ly for the purpose of avoiding taxation should be ignored for 
purposes of calculating the tax base” (EP, 2012a, p. 20). A third 
amendment dealt with the design of the apportionment for-
mula. A formula was proposed where sales by destination, la-
bour and assets were weighted at 10%, 45% and 45% respec-
tively, while the EC proposed a sharing formula in which these 
factors were equally weighted. It was argued that the adjusted 
formula would guarantee that exporting countries would not 
be disadvantaged in the apportionment. In the text of Thyssen, 
it was also written that the procedure for ‘enhanced coopera-
tion’ should be started up if the Council failed to decide unani-
mously on CCCTB (EP, 2012a).
12 No information was made public on the selection (discussions and 
voting results in the EP) of the individual submitted amendments. 
The third and fourth demand of the Belgian member of the European 
Greens party was not taken into consideration in the final text of Mar-
ianne Thyssen.
13 For a complete overview we refer to EP (2012a).
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During the debates on 18 April 2012, the representatives of the 
European parties recommended how to vote on the proposal 
of rapporteur Thyssen on the next day. Thyssen opened the 
debate as follows (EP, 2012b):
“… With this CCCTB, we will be making it fiscally simpler 
and administratively cheaper for companies to develop 
transnationally, which will definitely open up new oppor-
tunities for SMEs. Moreover, we will be making taxation 
more transparent. We will be preventing overtaxation and 
double taxation, as well as manipulation undertaken for 
the purpose of tax evasion. And, we will undoubtedly be 
making Europe more attractive for foreign investors …”
Table 3 gives an overview of the opinions of the several Euro-
pean parties. In line with the study of Hix & Noury (2009), we 
rank the political parties from the most left to the most right 
party. In general, representatives of the Greens, S&D, ALDE 
and EPP advised to vote positively on the proposal. By con-
trast, representatives of the right parties ECR and EFD advised 
to vote negatively on the proposal. The opposition of the right 
parties suggests evidence for the aversion of right parties to 
more European integration and a more strict government reg-
ulation. Going into more detail, all parties discussed the impact 
of tax competition under CCCTB. According to the left and cen-
trist parties, a harmonization of the tax bases would lead to a 
healthier tax competition, thereby increasing the efficiency of 
the internal market. However, the S&D stressed that the dis-
regarding of a minimum tax rate was a lost opportunity. Right 
parties declared that the EU should not intervene as tax base 
competition between members states would be good in terms 
of efficiency. During the debate, no reference was made to the 
results of specific economic impact studies. The Greens, S&D 
and EPP agreed that the introduction of a mandatory CCCTB 
would increase the legal certainty as tax minimizing behav-
iour of companies would be decreased and the administrative 
burden for member states reduced. By contrast, ALDE casted 
doubts on this decision and ECR and EFD were opponents of 
a mandatory system. Finally, ALDE mentioned that a smaller 
weight on the sales by destination factor would create a more 
fair allocation for countries with a big export sector (EP, 2012b).
On 19 April 2012, this proposal was approved in the EP with 
452 votes in favour (68%), 172 against (26%) and 36 absten-
tions (5%) (VoteWatch Europe, 2012). Members from Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Poland and Great 
Britain were the most sceptical about the amended CCCTB pro-
posal as more than 50% of their votes were ‘no’ votes. When 
looking at Table 4, 18 of a total of 22 Belgian MEPs voted ‘yes’, 
2 voted ‘no’ and 2 were absent. In general, 82% of the Belgian 
MEPs were positive about CCCTB. In line with the study of Hix 
& Noury (2009), the variable ‘party left right’ ranks the political 
parties from 1 being the most left and 7 being the most right 
party14. Table 4 shows that all present MEPs followed the Euro-
pean parties’ advice (see Table 3) on how to vote on the CCCTB 
proposal. In particular, Belgian MEPs of the Greens, S&D, ALDE 
and EPP voted positively, whereas a member of the ECR voted 
negatively. Two members were absent at the day of the voting, 
namely one member of the Greens and one member of the 
EFD party. The personal names of the Belgian MEPs are report-
ed in Appendix 1.
Beside the declarations of the European parties’ representa-
tives, two Belgian members made an additional statement dur-
ing the debates in the EP. Vice-chairman of the Greens party 
Philippe Lamberts declared (EP, 2012b):
“I believe, Ms Thyssen that you have gone as far as you can 
if you wish to gain a large majority for CCCTB in this Par-
liament … it is unthinkable for us to establish a voluntary 
28th corporate tax system alongside the 27 Member State 
systems, as evidently who will use it if it is optional, other 
than companies for whom it would constitute a lower ef-
fective tax rate than if they were to use their national sys-
14 Independent MEPs are considered as far right oriented (Hix & Noury, 
2009).
Table 4. Voting results CCCTB of Belgian MEPs
N=22 Total GUE-NGL Greens/EFA S&D ALDE/ADLE EPP ECR EFD NI
Vote
yes (82%) 18 0 3 5 5 5 0 0 0
no (9%) 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
abstain (0%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
absent (9%) 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Party left-right   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7
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tem? Indeed, I think that it is essential to make this system 
obligatory for large companies.”
Derk Jan Eppink, the Belgian vice-chairman of the ECR who vot-
ed negatively, explained his choice as follows (EP, 2012b):
“…When Member States collect corporation tax from com-
panies operating in several Member States, they have to 
divide the revenues between them. The allocation key 
which the Commission has devised for this purpose ad-
versely affects competitive and exporting countries. They 
are fiscally punished and lose revenue from corporate tax 
… and, yet, we have not carried out any thorough research 
into the fiscal effects of the allocation key proposed by the 
Commission … I therefore say: I am not going with this …”
4.3. Council of the European Union
The final decision on the adoption of a CCCTB, however, rests 
with the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Under the 
Irish Presidency in 2013, all member states committed to en-
gage in the technical discussions even if they were opponents 
of corporate tax harmonization. Since then, general issues (e.g. 
scope, definitions) and elements of the common tax base (e.g. 
calculation, timing, depreciation, losses) have been extensive-
ly discussed. At the end of 2014, discussions were shifted to-
wards the anti-abuse rules (e.g. interest limitation rule, switch-
over clause) included in the CCCTB proposal. In general, the 
debates in the Council have advanced with difficulty and hot 
potatoes like tax consolidation have been postponed. Impor-
tant to mention is that the published compromise texts of the 
Council should on no account be considered to be the final 
views of member states. Because of confidentiality, those texts 
do not elaborate on the individual positions adopted by mem-
ber states (Council of the European Union, 2013, 2014, 2015).
With respect to the position of the Belgian government, expla-
nations by the previous and current Ministers of Finance (chris-
tian-democrats and liberals) are scarce. Several parties in the 
Belgian Parliament criticized the lack of communication of the 
Belgian government concerning its position on CCCTB and the 
lack of information on the developments taking place in the 
Council. However, in line with previous declarations (Belgian 
Senate, 2013) current Minister of Finance Johan Van Overtveldt 
pronounced the following in 2015 (Belgian Chamber of Repre-
sentatives, 2015a: 112):
“… The Belgian government defends the principle of a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base and will sup-
port more fiscal harmonization, but on condition that it will 
not prevent a balanced budget …”
Other explanations in the Parliament show that the Belgian 
government rather takes a wait and see attitude and looks at 
the positions of big countries, especially France and Germany, 
by which it maintains close economic relations (Belgian Senate, 
2012; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 2015a).
Documents of Ihli (2011) and De Vos (2012) give a more de-
tailed insight into the Belgian views at the level of the articles 
mentioned in the 2011 EC’s proposal. In spite of its supportive 
attitude, the Belgian tax administration made several com-
ments to the proposal, which are summarized in Table 5. For a 
detailed technical explanation, we refer to Appendix 2.
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Current tax law literature on CCCTB has shown that sever-
al difficulties appear with the interpretation of concepts and 
that many conflicts exist between CCCTB and the DTCs, which 
would be problematic to ensure legal certainty. The majority 
of Belgian comments in Table 5 are dealing with these prob-
lems. In particular, incompatibilities occur with respect to ar-
ticles concerning foreign permanent establishments (PEs). In 
response to these conflicts, the Commission obliged member 
states to renegotiate all DTCs in order to align them with the 
CCCTB rules (EU, 2012, Art. 351). For Belgium, this would imply 
that almost all DTCs would have to be renegotiated, leading to 
a considerable amount of compliance costs (De Vos, 2012). In 
addition, Belgium seems to worry about the preservation of 
the corporate income tax revenues (see e.g. Art. 26 and Art. 76) 
and its attractiveness for domestic and foreign investments 
(see e.g. Art. 14 and Art. 102-103). In 2006, previous Belgian 
Minister of Finance Didier Reynders already expressed these 
concerns (Belgian Senate, 2006: 6500):
“… several member states like Belgium fear that the in-
troduction of a CCCTB will have a negative impact on the 
national corporate tax rates and on the national budget 
of several member states. In addition, it would not be al-
lowed for member states to apply fiscal incentives like the 
notional interest deduction to enhance the competitive-
ness of their economy. In the long run, this would harm 
a healthy tax competition … also, Belgium wonders if the 
national tax administrations are able to cooperate in an 
efficient way to collect and control corporate taxes …”
Several years later, these concerns are still present (Belgian 
Chamber of Representatives, 2015a: 112; 2015b: 216):
“… In order to obtain an efficient and fair internal market 
in the EU, more fiscal transparency should take absolute 
priority … however, it is necessary that member states can 
pursue their own policy sufficiently in order to secure a 
healthy tax competition … In all respects, Belgium will in-
sist on a detailed impact assessment of CCCTB”.
In order to adopt CCCTB, unanimity by the Council is required 
but the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
includes articles (Art. 20(2), 82, 329(1)) which allow CCCTB to 
be introduced under the ‘enhanced co-operation procedure’. 
Enhanced cooperation is a procedure where a minimum num-
ber of nine member states could introduce CCCTB. In 2011, the 
Belgian government declared that it would like to participate 
at such an enhanced cooperation, but only if its neighbouring 
countries would join the system (Belgian Chamber of Repre-
sentatives, 2011b: 32).
Table 5. Objections of Belgian government to CCCTB proposal (Ihli, 2011; De Vos, 2012)
Proposal on a CCCTB Directive (EC,2011) Belgian comments      
 
Articles conflicting with Belgian DTA  
Art. 5 Foreign PE definition incompatible with existing DTAs
Art. 11(e) Exempt income foreign PE unclear article
Art 14(1) g) Non-deductible costs foreign PE unclear article
Art.31 Transfer of assets to foreign PE unclear article
Art. 73 Switch-Over clause overruled by existing DTAs
Income foreign PE  
Foreign dividend income  
 
Other articles  
Art. 11 Exempt income; remove articles a) and b)
subsidies a) and proceeds of pooled assets b)  
Art. 14(1) j) Non-deductible taxes listed in Annex III remove article j)
Art. 26 Pension provisions apply national deduction to apportioned tax base
Art. 76 Interest and royalties income taxed at source introduce specific anti-abuse rules
Art. 102 and 103  
Items deductible against the apportioned share   no room for national deductions like NID  
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“… if not all countries of the EU could reach a consensus, 
a fiscal harmonisation between a limited number of coun-
tries would already be a positive evolution … if it would be 
possible to reach a fiscal harmonisation with Germany and 
France, so why not for the Benelux? ...”
5. CONCLUSIONS
On 16 March 2011, the European Commission (EC) launched 
its long-expected proposal for a CCCTB. By introducing corpo-
rate tax harmonization in the EU, the EC had 
the intention to remove the tax obstacles cur-
rently harming the international competitive-
ness of European companies. Applying case 
study methodology, this study investigated 
the views of Belgian politicians on the CCCTB 
in the Belgian Parliament, the European Par-
liament and the Council. The findings indicate 
that the majority of Belgian politicians were 
proponents of CCCTB. During the discussions 
in each of the political institutions, the politicians referred to 
the macro-economic impact, legal certainty and party ideology 
to found their opinion. The same discussion items reappeared 
and only slightly differed in form and content. Figure 1 syn-
thesises the determinants which played a role in the Belgian 
politicians’ support or resistance to CCCTB.
Figure 1. Determinants of political support for CCCTB                                     Figure 1: Determinants of political support for CCCTB 
 
Political support for CCCTB
Macro-economic effects
• corporate tax revenues
• employment
• FDI
• GDP
• welfare
national and EU level
Equity
Taxation of profit generating
factors
• Choice allocaton factors  
apportionment formula
Efficiency
Effects tax minimizing behaviour
• Tax competition versus  
harmonization of tax base/rate
• Tax compliance costs
companies
Party ideology
• national and european level
• pro/anti dimension on 
European integration
• left-right dimension on strict
government regulation
Legal certainty
• clearness and transparency of rules
• enforceability:
o relationship with DTAs
o coordination tax administrations
o compliance costs tax administrations
Certain item of CCCTB like the optionality of the system, the 
applied tax rate and the notional interest deduction involved 
clear differences in view between left and right-wing politi-
cians. These differences could hinder the formulation of a clear 
Belgian position on CCCTB.
Like other studies, this research suffers from a few shortcom-
ings. First, we assumed that the politicians’ personal ideological 
beliefs corresponded to those of their party. However, Hines 
(2002) showed that these beliefs could deviate from each 
other. Moreover, we did not take into account other individ-
ual characteristics like age, gender or educa-
tion. Surveys investigating individual factors 
influencing the opinion about CCCTB would 
be an interesting contribution to the litera-
ture. Second, even though case studies are 
difficult to generalize, we are convinced that 
these findings are applicable to most of the 
EU countries. Nevertheless, similar case stud-
ies in other EU-countries could investigate the 
robustness of our findings.
Finally, we like to mention that very recently the Commission 
re-launched CCCTB as it believes the Council will not be able 
to reach an agreement without a staged approach (EC, 2016). 
The new proposal would first apply the rules for calculating the 
common corporate tax base (CCTB) and postpone the consol-
idation and allocation (CCCTB) until agreement would be se-
cured on the common corporate tax base. One of the striking 
differences with the 2011 proposal, is that the re-launched 
initiative would be mandatory for big groups, introduce rules 
against debt bias in the form of an allowance for corporate 
equity and provide a super-deduction for R&D (EC, 2016). The 
revised proposal will again be assessed by the national parlia-
ments, the European Parliament and the Council. In the light 
of the findings of this study, we believe this revised proposal 
would give rise to similar discussions as the old one.
“Most Belgian politicians 
are pro CCCTB. However, 
left-right differences 
appeared concerning items 
like the optionality and the 
applied tax rate. This could 
hamper an univocal Belgian 
position on CCCTB.”
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Appendix 1
CFC members participating in CCCCTB debates (Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 2011a)
Ecolo-Groen! Muriël Gerkens
sp.a Dirk Van der Maelen
PS Christianne Vienne, Guy Coëme, Olivier Henry
Open Vld Gwendolyn Rutten
MR Philippe Goffin, Damien Thiéry
CD&V Servais Verherstraeten
cdH Josy Arens
N-VA Veerle Wouters, Peter Dedecker, Steven Vandeput
VB Hagen Goyvaerts            
Belgian MEPs voting on amended CCCTB proposal (EP, 2012b)
Green/EFA S&D ALDE/ADLE EPP
Frieda Bepoels Frédéric Daerden Philippe De Backer Ivo Belet
Isabelle Durant Véronique De Keyser Louis Michel Jean-Luc Dehaene
Philippe Lamberts Saïd El Khadraoui Annemie Neyts Anne Delvaux
Bart Staes Marc Tarabella Frédérique Ries Mathieu Grosch
  Kathleen Van Brempt Guy Verhofstadt Marianne Thyssen
ECR EFD NI  
Derk Jan Eppink Frank Vanhecke Philip Claeys  
Appendix 2. Technical explanation of Table 5
The Belgian tax administration has the opinion that the definition of a permanent establishment (PE) could lead to difficulties 
in relation with third countries when taking into account the existing network of Double Tax Agreements (DTAs). For example, 
according to Article 5 of the EC’s proposal “A building site or construction or installation project should constitute a PE only if it 
lasts more than twelve months” (EC, 2011, p. 20). A DTA between Belgium and a third country, however, could determine a PE if 
it lasts more than six months. According to Article 11(e) of the EC proposal all “income of a PE in a third country would be exempt 
from corporate tax” (EC, 2011, p. 23). For Belgium it is unclear if exempted income would relate to the gross or net income of 
the foreign PE. Another problem deals with the application of the switch-over clause as described in Article 73. Article 73 states 
that received profit distributions, proceeds from a disposal of shares and income of a PE in a third country cannot be exempt if 
it originates from a third country where “tax on profits are taxed at a statutory rate lower than 40% of the average statutory cor-
porate tax rate applicable in the Member States” (EC, 2011, p. 43). However, several Belgian DTAs will only refuse exemption if 
no effective taxation has taken place in the third country, i.e. the ‘subject to tax rule’. Further, Article 14(1) g) mentions that “costs 
incurred by a company for the purpose of deriving foreign PE income which is exempt to Article 11; such costs shall be treated 
as non-deductible and be fixed at a flat rate of 5% of that income” (EC, 2011, p. 23). The Belgian tax administrator wonders how 
the 5% of income would be calculated. Also, the prohibition to deduct expenses related to foreign PE would be in conflict with 
the double tax treaties. Belgium agrees with Article 31 stating that a transfer of an asset towards a third country should be taxa-
ble. However, it remains unclear if a transfer of an asset from a PE outside the EU towards another PE outside the EU would be 
covered by the current article (Ihli, 2011; De Vos, 2012).
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The Belgian tax authority also criticises articles which are not dealing with foreign PEs. According to Article 11 subsidies of fixed 
assets subject to depreciation (a) and proceeds from the disposal of pooled assets (b) are exempt from corporate tax. How-
ever, Belgium has the opinion that they are effectively taxed over the depreciation period as the amount of the subsidies and 
proceeds diminishes the basis on which the depreciations of the assets are calculated. Article 14(1) j) mentions that all local 
taxes which raise more than 20 % of the total amount of corporate tax in the member state are non-deductible expenses. For 
Belgium, this implies that registration duties are non-deductible. Nevertheless, Belgium doubts whether registration duties paid 
by corporations are more than 20% of the total corporate tax. It believes that the Commission has taken into account the total 
amount of registration duties. According to Article 26 pension provisions will be estimated using actuarial techniques and by 
reference discounted to Euribor for obligations with a maturity of 12 months. These provisions can be deducted without any 
limitation. As several European countries disallow pension deductions or limit these deductions, the Belgian tax administration 
believes the national legislation should apply. In case of a CCCTB group, the deduction of pension provisions should be applied 
to the apportioned share of the group members resident in that country. Article 76 mentions that received interest and royalties 
may be deducted from the tax liability when they have been taxed in another member state or third country. Belgium finds 
this article too generous and proposes to introduce specific anti-abuse provisions which prohibit the creation of artificial con-
structions between CCCTB companies and third parties with the sole aim to obtain the tax deduction. Finally, Articles 102 and 
103 of the EC proposal forbid any additional deductions from the apportioned profit. For Belgium, this means that national tax 
incentives like the notional interest deduction, patent income deduction and investment deduction are lost for CCCTB groups 
(Ihli, 2011; De Vos, 2012).
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